Not affiliated with Certinal.

Consent evidence and breach command · DPDP · Indian hospitals

Consent is evidence. Make it verifiable before 13 May 2027.

That is when the DPDP Rules' notice, security, breach and rights duties take effect for every hospital in India. Capturing consent is a solved problem; proving it, stopping processing when it is withdrawn, and reporting a breach on time are not. This is the evidence and breach layer that sits on top of a consent-capture product.

194 days to enforcement

Receipts verified

435 of 442

6 unsigned paper imports and 1 edited after signing, both flagged

Withdrawals propagated

33 of 44

7 in progress, 4 outside the 48h window

Open breach: Report to CERT-In

2h 12m

INC-2026-031, running live

DPDP readiness

98%

Seven controls, each derivable from the registry

Computed on this page load from the synthetic tenant, Kestrova Health (fictional); latest receipt 10 hours ago.

Three modules, one evidence format

Evidence

Each consent becomes a receipt bound to the exact notice version and language shown, the identity check and the teach-back grade the server established, sealed with Ed25519. Anyone verifies it offline with the public key; an edit after signing is caught.

Open the registry

Withdrawal that reaches processors

Withdrawing a purpose issues a signed event with a cease-processing notice to every processor that received the data, and tracks each acknowledgement against a clock. The receipt itself is never edited.

Withdraw a consent

Breach command

CERT-In in 6 hours, the Board and every patient without delay, the detailed report in 72. Rules set severity and duties; a model drafts the notices and offers a second opinion, within a daily budget.

Open breach command

What is real and what is simulated

The signing, verification, tokens, clocks, readiness score and AI budget are working code. Identity providers, processors and the hospital itself are simulated, and every screen says which is which.

Real Simulated in the demo Not built
  • Signed consent receipts

    Ed25519 · key ksv-47c7d4987f3a

    Ed25519 key derived from a deployment secret. Production would hold a per-hospital key in an HSM or cloud KMS. The public key is published, so anyone can verify a receipt offline.

  • Tamper detection

    Re-hash, then signature check

    Every verification recomputes the hash from the stored content first, so an edited receipt fails even when its stored hash and signature were never changed.

  • Server-bound evidence

    Identity and teach-back tokens

    The server signs only identity and comprehension facts it established itself, carried in 10-minute session-bound tokens.

  • Live AI

    Teach-back, drafting, second opinion

    Teach-back grading and advisory triage use Claude Haiku 4.5; Board and patient drafts use Claude Sonnet 4.5. Every call is inside a site-wide daily budget; past it, the deterministic engine runs and says so.

  • Legal clocks and duties

    Deterministic rules

    Board and patient intimation, the 72-hour report and the CERT-In 6-hour clock are computed by rules. No model decides a legal duty.

  • Withdrawal cascade

    Signed notices; processors simulated

    Each withdrawal is a signed event with one cease-processing notice per processor. The processors and their acknowledgements are simulated.

  • Identity providers

    OTP, ABHA and voice simulated

    No SMS is sent and the demo code is 123456. ABHA linkage and voice match are simulated and recorded as such; face liveness runs on the device.

  • Hospital data

    Synthetic tenant

    Kestrova Health, its patients, processors and incidents are fictional. Receipts you sign live only in your browser.

  • ABDM consent manager (HIE-CM) bridge

    Roadmap

    Designed for, not built in this version.

  • HIS/EMR write-back (FHIR export only)

    Roadmap

    Designed for, not built in this version.

  • Real SMS OTP and ABHA verification

    Roadmap

    Designed for, not built in this version.

  • Board and CERT-In e-filing

    Roadmap

    Designed for, not built in this version.

An outside-in product view

Certinal already markets healthcare consent and a DPDP offering to hospitals. This is an independent proposal for the adjacent layer a Group DPO will be asked about first: evidence that survives an audit, withdrawal that provably stops processing, and a breach response that meets its clocks.

Read the strategy and market view